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The economics and game theory literatures teem with examples of group decision situations where self–
interested behavior by individuals leads to outcomes that are ineﬃcient from the perspective of the group.
The prisoners dilemma (Flood (1952)), the tragedy of the commons (Hardin (1968)), and the market for
lemons (Akerlof (1970)) are models of three such situations; these three are so well–known as to have
crossed over into non–academic discourse. Many other such situations exist. Because these situations are
so common, there has been some eﬀort to theoretically study mechanisms aimed at improving eﬃciency in
these situations. There have been relatively few empirical tests of such mechanisms, however.
The goal of this paper is to empiricallyexamine the eﬀects of a mechanism designed to improveeﬃciency
in one particular situation. The situation we use is the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)),
a simple collective–action game played between two players. One player—who will be referred to as the
investor—has the choice of either investing or not investing in a project, which is administered by the other
player—who will be referred to as the allocator. With certainty, the investment is successful, in the sense
that the amount invested multiplies in value.1 However, the allocator controls the proceeds of investment:
he can either keep them for himself or share them with the investor.
The trust game is often used as metaphors for more complicated social situations. The amount of
investment observed in this game is a measure of the amount of trust investors have in allocators. The
portion of investment proceeds given back to investors measure the amount of trustworthiness of allocators.
Under this interpretation, the prediction of game theory is dismal indeed: the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game has the investor refusing to invest, forseeing that the allocator would keep the
entire proceeds of any investment.2 This equilibrium is ineﬃcient; total payoﬀs are higher if the investor
invests, and indeed it is possible for the allocator to split the proceeds of investment in such a way as
to make both players strictly better oﬀ than in equilibrium. However, in this simple game, there are no
binding contracts, nor any other way for the allocator to credibly commit to share the proceeds rather
than keep them all.
The mechanism we consider is relatively simple. We add a pre–play stage to the trust game, in which
the allocator has the opportunity to place an amount of money into an escrow account, to be returned
to him if he shares the proceeds from investment, but forfeited if he keeps them for himself. (The escrow
amount is also returned to the allocator if the investor does not invest.) If the allocator places a large
enough amount into escrow, he will have an incentive to share instead of keeping, as the loss of the escrow
amount outweighs the gain from keeping. In this case, the mechanism is predicted to achieve an eﬃcient
(and equitable) outcome.
In order to examine the eﬀects of this mechanism, we design and run a human–subjects experiment
that looks at two versions of the escrow game, diﬀering sharply in subgame perfect equilibrium predictions.
1In our treatment, the investment quadruples. Other versions have the investment doubling or trebling.
2Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, we will use terminology such as “theoretical prediction”, “equilibrium
prediction”, or “prediction of game theory” to mean the combination of appropriate equilibrium concepts (usually subgame
perfect equilibrium) and the assumption that players’ preferences concern only their own monetary payoﬀs. We acknowledge
that this is an abuse of terminology, as game theory itself makes no assumptions about what form preferences may take, and
if players’ preferences concern non–monetary aspects, the true equilibrium predictions may be diﬀerent.
1In one, it is possible for the allocator to choose a large enough escrow amount to achieve eﬃciency. In a
second version, escrow is possible, but the amount is not large enough to be a credible commitment by the
allocator, so investment should not occur. We compare the results of these games to those of three other
games: a Control treatment in which escrow is not an option (that is, a basic trust game); and two “forced
escrow” games, in which the escrow decision is not made by the allocator, but rather imposed on him by
the experimenter.
Our primary source of hypotheses for the eﬀects of our mechanism is standard game theory. Its
predictions are simple. When the large amount is put into escrow, eﬃciency is high, as the investor
invests. Also, the allocator splits the proceeds of investment in this case. When either the small amount
or nothing at all is put into escrow, the result is the same as in the basic trust game: the investor does
not invest (and if she did, the allocator would keep the proceeds), so eﬃciency is low. These predictions
are unaﬀected by whether escrow decisions are voluntary or forced, and also by which escrow choices are
possible.
Many experimental researchers have found that behavioral theories (other–regardingpreferences, bounded
rationality, or a combination of the two) can characterize aspects of decisions that standard game theory
cannot. So, in addition to standard game theory, we examine two behavioral sources of hypotheses. Ac-
cording to “crowding out” (Ostrom (2000)), individuals’ intrinsic tendency toward cooperative behavior is
damaged by mechanisms providing ﬁnancial incentives for such behavior. As a result, a mechanism that
provides weak ﬁnancial incentives (too small to change the monetary best responses) would actually result
in less cooperation, and thus lower eﬃciency, than if there had been no mechanism at all—in contrast to
the equilibrium prediction of no diﬀerence. We also considered a “signaling” theory, according to which a
choice by the allocator of the largest possible escrow amount can be taken as a signal that the allocator
intends to split the proceeds of investment—even if this largest escrow amount is too small to change the
allocator’s monetary incentives after investment. If this is true, then behavior following a given escrow
amount will depend to some extent on which other amounts were permitted; speciﬁcally, investment (if
investors interpret this behavior as signals) and splitting (if allocators actually are signaling) will be higher
when the escrow amount is the highest possible, and voluntary rather than forced, than when either of
these is not true.
Our results are largely in line with standard game theory. When the large amount is placed by allocators
into escrow—irrespective of whether it was chosen or forced—high levels of eﬃciency result, as investors
generally invest in this case, correctly anticipating that allocators will split the proceeds with them. Since
not only investors, but also allocators, earn high payoﬀs compared to the no–investment outcome, it is
not surprising that when allocators do have the option of the large escrow amount, they nearly always
choose it. On the other hand, when escrow is not possible at all, or when only a low escrow amount is
possible, allocators are much less likely to split the proceeds of investment, and the frequency of their
doing so declines over time. Perhaps in response, investment in these cases also declines over time, from
initial levels comparable to the high–escrow case to ﬁnal levels much lower, in some cases even zero. We do
ﬁnd higher levels of investment and splitting following the low escrow amount than following a zero escrow
amount, which is inconsistent with the theory, though for allocators, these diﬀerences die out over time.
On the other hand, our results show little support for the behavioral theories; at best, they describe
2some aspects of early–round decisions, which go away as the experiment progresses. By and large, crowding
out does not occur. If we consider a weakened version of the crowding–out hypothesis, restricting ourselves
to behavior following only the zero escrow amount (not the low amount), then investment and splitting
are indeed less frequent in the escrow treatments than in the Control treatment; however, this eﬀect is
compensated for by the higher levels of investment and splitting following the low escrow amount, making
the net eﬀect insigniﬁcant most of the time. As for our signaling hypotheses, we do ﬁnd that in early
rounds, investment following an allocator’s choice of a low escrow amount is substantially higher when
that was the highest amount possible than when a higher amount was possible, and by the same token,
investment following nothing put into escrow was initially higher when escrow was not possible than when
it was. However, we do not ﬁnd the same diﬀerences in allocators’ subsequent decisions, suggesting that
the investors’ interpretation of the escrow decision as a signal is mistaken. Investors seem to eventually
ﬁgure this out, so that the eﬀect dies out over time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the basic trust game, the mechanism,
and the associated predictions from standard game theory and behavior game theory. In Section 3, we
describe the procedures used in the experiment. In Section 4, we list the experimental results and compare
these results to our hypotheses. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize our main results and discuss their
implications.
2 Theories and implications
The basic game is shown in Figure 1. The investor has two units of money that she can either invest or
not invest. (Investing a partial amount is not possible.) If she does not invest, the game ends, she keeps
her money, and the allocator gets nothing. If she invests, her money quadruples in amount and becomes
property of the allocator, who may either split it evenly with the investor or keep it all for himself. Under
the assumption that both players’ payoﬀs are identical to their monetary earnings, this game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in which the investor does not invest because she correctly foresees that, if
she does, the allocator returns nothing to her.3
Figure 1: The basic trust game
 Investor















Many researchers have studied experimentally the trust game and related games (such as the labor–
market games with incomplete contracts examined by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993)). The main
3This game, as well as the game described in the next section, also has non–subgame–perfect Nash equilibria. These
equilibria are all equivalent along the path of play: in all of them, the investor does not invest, and the allocator keeps with
high enough probability that it does not pay the investor to invest.
3results of these experiments have been as follows: investors often invest with nonnegligible positive fre-
quency; allocators return a positive amount with nonnegligible frequency (though many return nothing, as
theory predicts); when multiple investment and return amounts are possible, returns by allocators tend to
increase with the amount invested; and amounts returned average about the same as, or somewhat below,
amounts invested (so that investors typically do not earn a proﬁt by investing). These qualitative results
have been replicated in diﬀerent countries (e.g., Barr (2003) in Zimbabwe); using abstract language or
various types of context; with binary choices (that is, invest either all or nothing) or nearly–continuous
choices; with the investment amount being multiplied by varying amounts; and with many diﬀerent stake
sizes, including very large stakes (e.g., Johansson–Stenman, Mahmud, and Martinsson (2004), who used a
stake size of two weeks’ income) and the case of hypothetical payments (Holm and Nystedt (2004)). Re-
searchers have also examined relationships between investor and/or allocator behavior and many possible
correlates, including measures of risk attitudes from surveys or lottery–choice problems (Eckel and Wilson
(2004a), Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)), measures of trust attitudes from surveys or other games (Glaeser
et al. (2000)), measures of social distance (Glaeser et al. (2000)), demographic features of subjects or their
opponents (Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Eckel and Wilson (2002, 2004b), Croson and Buchan (1999)),
opponents’ facial expressions (Scharlemann et al. (2001), Eckel and Wilson (2004b)), political ideology
and political–party identiﬁcation (Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo (2004)), ﬁnite versus indeﬁnite repetition
of the game (Engle–Warnick and Slonim (2004)), experience playing the game (Engle–Warnick and Slonim
(2004)), whether the game is in normal– or extensive–form representation (Deck (2001)), and elicitation
and/or transmission of beliefs about opponent’s play (Guerra and Zizzo (2004)).
2.1 The escrow mechanism
Because the subgame perfect equilibrium of the basic trust game is not eﬃcient, it is of interest to examine
small modiﬁcations of the game that may lead to increased eﬃciency. We consider the following variation,
which we call an “escrow game”. Before the investor’s decision, the allocator has the opportunity to place
a nonnegative amount a ∈ A in “escrow” (where the nonempty set A of allowable escrow amounts is our
treatment variable). This amount is forfeited if the investor invests and the allocator keeps the returns;
it is returned to the allocator otherwise. Figure 2 shows the subgame that results after the allocator’s
Figure 2: Subgame of escrow game after escrow amount of a is chosen
 Investor















decision a is made. The nature of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame depends on the size of
a.I fa<4, the escrow amount is small enough that the allocator would still keep the returns from any
investment (forfeiting the escrow amount) rather than splitting them, so that the investor will not invest.
4In this case, subgame perfect equilibrium predicts no behavioral diﬀerence between this subgame and the
original game shown in Figure 1. If a>4, on the other hand, the escrow amount is large enough that the
allocator would rather split the returns from investment, so that the investor will invest. In this case, the
subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame is eﬃcient.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game (the allocator choosing some a ∈ A,t h e np l a y
of the resulting subgame shown in Figure 2) depends on the elements contained in A.I f A contains
only amounts less than 4, then regardless of the allocator’s choice, the investor will not invest (since the
allocator would keep any returns from investment). Since any escrow choice by the allocator leads to the
same payoﬀs, subgame perfect equilibrium doesn’t predict which escrow choice he will make. If A contains
any amount(s) greater than 4, however, the allocatorwill choose some such amount, the investor will invest,
and the allocator will split. Since any escrow choice above 4 gives the allocator the same payoﬀ, subgame
perfect equilibrium again does not predict which such choice he will make.
2.2 Experimental design and hypotheses
In our experiment, we consider ﬁve treatments, diﬀering in A—the set of possible a—as well as how
the escrow decision is made. In our control treatment, no escrow is possible, so that A = {0}.I n o u r
“Escrow03” treatment, we set A = {0,3}, and in our “Escrow036” treatment, A = {0,3,6}. In addition,
there are two “forced escrow” treatments, where a third party (the computer program) determines the
escrow amount, rather than the allocator making the choice. These treatments parallel our Escrow03 and
Escrow036 treatments; in our “Forced03” treatment, we again have A = {0,3}, and in our “Forced036”
treatment, A = {0,3,6}. (We will sometimes refer to the Escrow03 and Escrow036 treatments as our
“voluntary escrow” treatments in contrast.) A summary of the treatments and corresponding subgame
perfect equilibrium predictions is shown in Table 1; also shown is a measure of eﬃciency, which we deﬁne
as the sum of investor and allocator payoﬀs, normalized so that 0 and 1 represent the minimum and
maximum eﬃciencies. Notice that from a game–theoretic standpoint, the only determinant of investment
and splitting is the amount placed into escrow; whether the escrow choice was voluntary or forced does
not matter, nor does the existence of larger or smaller alternative escrow choices.
The pre–play escrow stage is an example of a mechanism designed to improve eﬃciency. As discussed
above, according to subgame perfect equilibrium, this mechanism should work if and only if an escrow
amount larger than 4 is chosen. This is possible in the Escrow036 and Forced036 treatments, but not in
the Control treatment (where there is no escrow at all), nor in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments
(where the escrow amounts are too small). This implies that when the escrow amount is 6, investors will
choose Invest and allocators will choose Split, whereas when the escrow amount is 0 or 3, they will not.
This implies the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 The frequency of Invest will be higher following an escrow amount of 6 than following an
escrow amount of 0 or 3.
Hypothesis 2 The frequency of Split will be higher following an escrow amount of 6 than following an
escrow amount of 0 or 3.
5Table 1: Treatments and game–theoretic predictions
Treatment Escrow Probability Conditional Conditional Eﬃciency
amount chosen Prob(Invest) Prob(Split)
Control 0 1 0 0 0
Escrow03 0 * 0 0 0
3* 0 0 0
00 0 0 0
Escrow036 3 0 0 0 0
61 1 1 1
Forced03 0 — 0 0 0
3— 0 0 0
0— 0 0 0
Forced036 3 — 0 0 0
6— 1 1 1
∗: Either escrow amount can be chosen in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hypothesis 3 The frequency of Invest will be the same following an escrow amount of 0 as following an
escrow amount of 3.
Hypothesis 4 The frequency of Split will be the same following an escrow amount of 0 as following an
escrow amount of 3.
While the game–theoretic prediction of the impact of the escrow mechanism is clear, there is a good
amount of evidence from the experimental economics literature suggesting that the actual impact may be
diﬀerent. Ostrom (2000) summarizes a large body of research on collective–action problems (including the
trust game), and ﬁnds several empirical regularities. Two of these regularities are (1) in situations like our
basic trust game, levels of cooperative behavior are substantially higher than would be predicted by game
theory, but (2) when rules are added to the game in an attempt to motivate cooperative behavior, people
act approximately as game theory predicts. Together, these results imply that “externally imposed rules
tend to ‘crowd out’ endogenous cooperative behavior” (p. 147).4
This “crowding out” hypothesis has implications for the games used in our experiment. Our Control,
Escrow03 (and Forced03), and Escrow036 treatments correspond, respectively, to the three cases that can
occur: (1) no externally–imposed rules, (2) weak externally–imposed rules, and (3) strong externally–
imposed rules. In our Control treatment—where no external rules are imposed—levels of investment and
splitting (cooperative play) ought to be substantially higher than game theory predicts. When rules are
4Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger (2004) discuss some of the more recent research on crowding out, including experiments in
which crowding out did not occur. They also present the results of their own experiment, in which crowding out does not
occur. They conclude that under some circumstances, formal mechanisms can actually be complements to informal social
norms, rather than substitutes, as crowding out implies.
6imposed, levels of investment and splitting ought to be similar to the game–theoretic prediction, but the
prediction itself will depend on the strength of the rules. In our Escrow036 treatment, the rules are strong
enough to make cooperative behavior rational (in the sense of maximizing monetary payoﬀs), so there
should be high levels of investment and splitting. In our Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments, where rules
are in place, but they are not strong enough to make cooperative behavior rational, levels of investment
and splitting should be as game theory predicts. Noting that the game–theoretic prediction for the Escrow
03 and Forced03 treatments is the same as that for the Control treatment, and that as mentioned above,
actual levels for the latter should be higher than the game–theoretic prediction, the implication is that
levels of investment and splitting should actually be even less in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments
than in the Control treatment. In the Forced036 treatment, externally–imposed rules are either strong
or weak, depending on whether the escrow amount imposed is 6 or less than 6. In either case, levels of
investment and splitting should be as game theory predicts: high (as in the Escrow036 treatment) when
the escrow amount is 6, and low (as in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments) when the escrow amount
is either 0 or 3.
Thus, the “crowding out” hypothesis implies that Hypotheses 1 and 2 above should still hold, but
Hypotheses 3 and 4 should be replaced by:
Hypothesis 5 The frequency of Invest will be higher in the Control treatment than in each of the other
treatments following an escrow amount of 0 or 3.
Hypothesis 6 The frequency of Split will be higher in the Control treatment than in each of the other
treatments following an escrow amount of 0 or 3.
An alternative “signaling” theory makes almost the opposite prediction. According to this theory,
allocators who intend to Split will signal their cooperative intention by placing the maximum possible
amount into escrow, thus making it more costly to Keep later (if the investor invests). In the Escrow036
treatment, of course, this is no diﬀerent from what equilibrium predicts. If allocators are signaling with
their escrow choices, however, then even in the Escrow03 treatment, an escrow choice of 3 should increase
cooperative behavior: investors will anticipate that allocators intend to choose Split, so they will choose
Invest.
This reasoning implies that other things equal, cooperative behavior should be more likely when the
escrow amount chosen by the allocator was the largest escrow amount possible—and of course, that this
amount was actually chosen by the allocator, not imposed externally. This leads to the following hypotheses
(in addition to Hypotheses 1 and 2 above):
Hypothesis 7 In the Escrow03 treatment, the frequency of Invest will be higher following an escrow choice
of 3 than following an escrow choice of 0.
Hypothesis 8 In the Escrow03 treatment, the frequency of Split will be higher following an escrow choice
of 3 than following an escrow choice of 0.
Hypothesis 9 Following an escrow choice of 3, the frequency of Invest will be higher in the Escrow03
treatment than in the Escrow036, Forced03, or Forced036 treatments.
7Hypothesis 10 Following an escrow choice of 3, the frequency of Split will be higher in the Escrow03
treatment than in the Escrow036, Forced03, or Forced036 treatments.
Several other researchers have looked experimentally at mechanisms for improving outcomes in games
where the equilibriumis ineﬃcient. Many of these mechanisms havebeen designed speciﬁcally for collective–
action problems. Andreoni and Varian (1999) examine the ability of a “compensation mechanism” (an-
alyzed by Varian (1994)) to facilitate cooperation. In their experiment, subjects play 15 rounds of an
asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma, then 25 rounds of a modiﬁed version of the game in which, prior to play,
each player chooses how much to oﬀer her opponent in exchange for cooperating, and then each player
is told what she has been oﬀered to cooperate. This mechanism changes the equilibrium prediction to
one in which both players cooperate (along with suitable compensations in the pre–play stage). However,
Andreoni and Varian’s results were mixed. They did ﬁnd, as predicted, that cooperative behavior was
higher under the mechanism than without it. However, the increase in cooperative behavior was much
smaller than predicted: cooperation was higher than predicted without the mechanism, but lower than
predicted with the mechanism. It is not clear why cooperation under the mechanism was so low; even
following choices large enough to induce cooperation in equilibrium, the frequency of cooperation was only
about 70%. It is worth keeping their results in mind, as their mechanism is similar in nature to the escrow
mechanism we use (the main diﬀerence is that their mechanism involves players making decisions that
change each other’s incentives, while ours involves a player changing his own incentives).
Houser et al. (2004) designed a trust game experiment involving a mechanism that is similar in some
ways to Andreoni’s. Along with choosing an investment amount, investors choose a desired amount to be
returned to them by allocators, and threaten punishment if the allocator returns less than that amount.
(Thus, they also have players making decisions that change their counterparts’ incentives, but in this case,
they are punishments rather than rewards.) Their results are consistent with crowding out. When no
sanctions were threatened, allocators typically returned a positive amount—though less than the investor
requested. When sanctions were threatened, allocator behavior depended on the severity of the sanctions:
strong sanctions led to allocators returning the amount requested (though not more), while weak sanctions
often led to nothing at all being returned. Interestingly, their results were robust to whether the threat
was made by the investor or randomly by the experiment computer program.
Falkinger et al. (2000) considered a “tax–subsidy mechanism” (proposed by Falkinger (1996)) in which
a third party—such as a government—sets a tax/subsidy rate before the players choose their contributions
toward a public good. After contributions are chosen, players are rewarded or ﬁned according to their
deviation from the mean contribution level; players making above–average contributions are rewarded
proportionally to how far above average their contributions were, and those making below–average contri-
butions are punished in a similar way.5 Falkinger et al. (2000) designed an experiment in which subjects
played public–good games under several parameterizations (they varied the number of players, the produc-
tion function for the public good, players’ incomes and marginal rates of substitution between the public
and private goods, and the tax/subsidy rate). Depending on the treatment, subjects played either 10 or 20
5Falkinger (2004) extends his previous model by adding an earlier stage in which players invest in an enforcement technology,
which determines the eﬀective tax/subsidy rate for the second stage.
8rounds of a basic public–good game with no mechanism followed by the same number of rounds with the
mechanism, or either 10 or 20 rounds with the mechanism followed by the same number of rounds without
it. They found that cooperative behavior—and therefore, provision of the public good—was substantially
higher with the mechanism than without it, but again, the diﬀerence was less than the equilibrium predic-
tion. Subjects contributed much more than predicted in the basic public–good game (that is, without the
mechanism), but either less than predicted (when the predicted contribution level was the player’s entire
income, and thus the maximum of the strategy set) or roughly as much as predicted (when the predicted
contribution level was less than the player’s income, and thus in the interior of the strategy set) when the
mechanism was present.
Bracht, Figui` eres, and Ratto (2004) extended the work of Andreoni and Varian (1999) and Falkinger
et al. (2000), by more directly comparing the two mechanisms studied by them. The game they used was
a two–player public–good game with utility linear in the public good and concave in the private good,
so that both the Nash equilibrium and the joint–payoﬀ–maximizing outcome were in the interior of the
strategy set (both for the basic game and under each mechanism). Subjects in the experiment played 20
rounds of this basic public–good game, then 20 rounds of a game with one of the two mechanisms. Bracht,
Figui` eres, and Ratto found that both mechanisms led to increased cooperative behavior, but the increases
were smaller than predicted. When there was no mechanism, contributions were consistently above the
equilibrium level (though they moved toward it over time). Under the tax–subsidy mechanism, similarly,
contributions started above the equilibrium level but reached it by the end of the session. Under the
compensation mechanism, however, contributions started at the equilibrium level but decreased over time
until ending well below it (though still higher than without the mechanism).
The results of these four experiments were largely consistent with each other, and carry two implications
for us. First, the performance of these mechanisms seems to be relatively robust to small changes in
experimental parameters and procedures. Second, there is substantial crowding out: while cooperative
behavior is well above equilibrium levels when no mechanism is in place, under any of these mechanisms,
levels of cooperation are usually no higher, and indeed are often lower, than the equilibrium prediction.
3 Experimental procedures
Our design is made up of ﬁve treatments, as listed in Table 1 above. In all experimental sessions, subjects
started by playing 5 rounds of the basic trust game—with no escrow possible. This was intended to
familiarize subjects with the strategic situation and the computer interface. After the ﬁrst 5 rounds were
completed, subjects played 10 rounds of a game that depended on the treatment. In the Control treatment,
these next 10 rounds were also of the basic trust game; in the remaining treatments, these 10 rounds were
of the corresponding game (for example, the Escrow03 game in our Escrow03 treatment).6 All subjects in
an experimental session were playing the same game. Each session involved 20 subjects, with the exception
of one Control session that had only 18 subjects and one Escrow036 session that had only 10 subjects.
6Note here the distinction we draw between game and treatment in our nomenclature. Each treatment begins with 5 rounds
of the basic trust game, then is followed by 10 rounds of a game—possibly the trust game again (in the Control treatment),
and possibly one of the four other games (in each case, in the treatment of the same name).
9Subjects were primarily undergraduate students from University College London and Exeter University,
and were recruited by a variety of methods, including physically posted announcements, postings to an
university experiments website, and via a database of participants in previous experiments and others
expressing interest in participating in experiments. No one took part in more than one session of this
experiment.
At the beginning of a session, each subject was seated in a single room and given a set of written
instructions for the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds.7 At this point, the subjects were not told how (or if) the game would
diﬀer in the last ten rounds, though the instructions stated that these ﬁve rounds made up the ﬁrst part
of the experiment, that the second part might be diﬀerent, and that the rules for the second part would
be discussed after the ﬁrst part ended. The instructions for the ﬁrst part were read aloud to the subjects,
in an attempt to make the rules of the game common knowledge. After the ﬁfth round of a session was
completed, each subject was given a copy of the instructions for the remaining ten rounds. These were
also read aloud, after which the remaining ten rounds were played.
The experiment was run on networked computer terminals, using the z–Tree experiment software pack-
age (Fischbacher (1999)). Subjects were asked not to communicate with other subjects, so the only inter-
actions were via the computer program. Subjects were randomly assigned to roles (investor or allocator) at
the beginning of a session and remained in the same role throughout the session. Investors and allocators
were matched using a round–robin matching format; in Rounds 1–5, each investor would be matched to
each allocator at most once (and vice versa), and in Rounds 6–15, each investor would be matched to each
allocator exactly once.8 In a round of the basic trust game (either in those sessions where it was played for
all 15 rounds, or in the ﬁrst 5 rounds of the other sessions), investors were prompted to choose whether they
would Invest or Not Invest their 2 units. After the investors’ choices were entered, each allocator would
see his counterpart’s decision; if it was Invest, the allocator would then be prompted to choose whether he
would Split or Keep. After the allocators had entered their decisions, all subjects received feedback from
the just–completed round: the investor’s choice, the allocator’s choice (if the investor chose Invest), and
the subject’s own payoﬀ. Subjects were not explicitly told their counterparts’ payoﬀs, though they were
given enough information to be able to calculate them easily if they wished. Subjects were not given any
information about the results of other pairs of subjects.
In a round of either the Escrow03 or the Escrow036 game (Rounds 6–15 of the corresponding treat-
ments), the sequence of play was similar, except for the escrow decision. In these treatments, a round
would begin with allocators’ being prompted to choose which of the allowable escrow amounts would be
placed into escrow. Each investor would see her counterpart’s decision before making her investment de-
cision. After investment decisions were entered, allocators received this information as in the basic trust
game and were then prompted to choose whether to Split or Keep. In the Forced03 and Forced036 games,
the sequence of play was identical, except that allocators did not choose the escrow amounts, but rather
7The instructions used in the experiment, as well as the raw data, are available from the corresponding author upon request.
8An implication of this matching mechanism is that over a ﬁfteen–round session, subjects would be matched with some
other subjects more than once. We tried to reduce the possibility that this would lead to repeated–game eﬀects by not telling
subjects the ID number of their counterparts, so that in the last ten rounds, each only knew that with positive probability,
their current counterpart was someone with whom they were matched earlier.
10were informed of them at the same time investors were. The computer program chose each possible escrow
amount with probability one–half in the Forced03 treatment and with probability approximately one–third
in the Forced036 treatment. Subjects’ feedback at the end of a round in each of the voluntary– and
forced–escrow treatments was as in the basic trust game, with the addition of the escrow amount. In all
treatments, at the end of a round, subjects were asked to observe their result, write the information from
that round down in a record sheet, and then click a button to continue to the next round.
At the end of Round 15 of any treatment, the experimental session ended. All subjects received a £5
show–up fee.9 In addition, one of the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and one of the last ten rounds were randomly chosen,
and each subject received his/her earnings from these two rounds, at an exchange rate of £1p e rp o i n t .
Subjects earned an average of about £10 for participating in a session, which typically lasted between 30
and 45 minutes.
4 Experimental results
The experiment consisted of a total of ﬁfteen sessions, three of each treatment.
4.1 Session aggregates
Some features of the aggregate data are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the relative frequencies of
Invest choices by investors in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds (when subjects were playing the basic trust game in all
sessions), the conditional relative frequencies of Split choices by allocators (given Invest) in these rounds,
and the payoﬀ eﬃciency (as in Table 1, the average joint payoﬀ, normalized so that the maximum possible
eﬃciency is one and the minimum possible is zero).10 This table also shows the levels of investment,
Table 2: Aggregate results from rounds 1–5 (no escrow)
Frequency Conditional Eﬃciency
of Invest Frequency of Split
Control sessions 0.567 (85/150) 0.376 (32/85) 0.567
Escrow03 sessions 0.593 (86/145) 0.442 (38/86) 0.593
Escrow036 sessions 0.448 (56/125) 0.446 (25/56) 0.448
Forced03 sessions 0.533 (80/150) 0.325 (26/80) 0.533
Forced036 sessions 0.527 (79/150) 0.228 (18/79) 0.527
All sessions 0.536 (386/720) 0.360 (139/386) 0.536
splitting, and eﬃciency broken down by treatment. Since subjects were playing the same game in these
9At the time of the experiment, £1 was worth roughly $1.80.
10When escrow is not possible, eﬃciency is therefore simply equal to the frequency of Invest choices. We list eﬃciencies
separately so that one could easily make comparisons with treatments in which escrow is possible and eﬃciency therefore
depends not only on the frequency of Invest choices, but also on that of Keep choices.
11rounds, regardless of the treatment (diﬀerences in the game across treatments didn’t begin until round 6),
and at this stage had not been given any information as to how, if at all, the second part of the experiment
would diﬀer from the ﬁrst, any diﬀerences observed across treatments here could be construed as being
due to random variation in trust or trustworthiness across individual subjects (and perhaps other subjects
reacting to this).
Behavior in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds is substantially diﬀerent from the subgame perfect equilibrium pre-
diction, as Table 2 shows: both Invest and Split do occur with nonnegligible frequency. Investors choose
Invest slightly more than half the time overall. This average hides a lot of variation across sessions—
levels vary from 32% to 72%—but surprisingly little variation across treatments. Allocators choose Split
about 36% of the time on average over these ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. There is again substantial variation across
sessions—ranging from 20% to 58%—and somewhat more variation across treatments than there was for
Invest.
These aggregate results—levels of investment and returns bounded well away from both zero and one—
replicate those of other trust game studies. Also in line with previous results, the average amount returned
to investors (conditional on investment) in each of the ﬁve treatments is somewhat below the level that
would make Invest an expected–payoﬀ–maximizingstrategy for them (though there were individual sessions
in which this was not true).
With the results from the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds as a benchmark, we next turn to the remainder of the
experimental session, where possible escrow amounts did vary across sessions. Table 3 shows the relative
frequencies of Invest and Split choices, as well as eﬃciencies, for the last ten rounds of each treatment—
both overall and broken down by the escrow amount chosen. In the Control treatment, where escrow is
not possible, results are comparable to what we saw in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. Investment happens somewhat
less than half the time; when it does, allocators choose Split somewhat less than half the time (so again,
investment is not proﬁtable for investors). Eﬃciency is less than what it was in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds, though
this decrease is small.
In the Escrow036 and Forced036 treatments, large escrow amounts are possible, and this leads to
marked changes in behavior. Following an escrow choice of 6, investors invest over 90% of the time in the
Escrow036 treatment and 100% of the time in the Forced036 treatment, and conditional on investment,
allocatorssplit97% of the time in the Escrow036treatment and 95% of the time in the Forced036 treatment.
In the Forced036 treatment, allocators cannot choose the escrow amount, but in the Escrow036 treatment,
where they can, they choose to put 6 into escrow over three–quarters of the time. When allocators put less
than 6 into escrow, investors seldom invest, though they do invest more often following an escrow amount
of 3 (23% of the time in the Escrow036 treatment and 32% of the time in the Forced036 treatment)
than following a 0 escrow amount (12% of the time in the Escrow036 treatment and 8% of the time in
the Forced036 treatment). Following investment, allocators split with frequency between 25% and 40%,
depending on the escrow amount and whether it is forced or voluntary. Eﬃciency in these treatments is
close to one following an escrow amount of 6, but low when the escrow amount is anything else.
In the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments, only low escrow amounts are possible. Overall, levels of
investment and splitting in these two treatments are comparable to those in the Control treatment, but
this obscures diﬀerences between play after escrow amounts of 0 and play after escrow amounts of 3. Both
12Table 3: Results from rounds 6–15—aggregate and conditional on escrow amount chosen
Cell Escrow Frequency Conditional Conditional Eﬃciency
Amount Chosen Freq.—Invest Freq.—Split
Control 0 1.000 (300/300) 0.400 (120/300) 0.408 (49/120) 0.400
0 0.228 (66/290) 0.136 (9/66) 0.000 (0/9) 0.136
Escrow03 3 0.772 (224/290) 0.589 (132/224) 0.394 (52/132) 0.411
Total — 0.486 (141/290) 0.369 (52/141) 0.348
0 0.500 (150/300) 0.207 (31/150) 0.161 (5/31) 0.207
Forced03 3 0.500 (150/300) 0.593 (89/150) 0.427 (38/89) 0.423
Total — 0.400 (120/300) 0.358 (43/120) 0.315
0 0.100 (25/250) 0.120 (3/25) 0.333 (1/3) 0.120
Escrow036 3 0.140 (35/250) 0.229 (8/35) 0.375 (3/8) 0.157
6 0.760 (190/250) 0.921 (175/190) 0.971 (170/175) 0.895
Total — 0.744 (186/250) 0.935 (174/186) 0.714
0 0.333 (100/300) 0.080 (8/100) 0.250 (2/8) 0.080
Forced036 3 0.323 (97/300) 0.320 (31/97) 0.355 (11/31) 0.216
6 0.343 (103/300) 1.000 (103/103) 0.951 (98/103) 0.951
Total — 0.473 (142/300) 0.782 (111/142) 0.423
investment and splitting are substantially more frequent in the latter case than in the former—in both
Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments—though neither approaches the level we saw in the Escrow036 and
Forced036 treatments after an escrow amount of 6. Eﬃciency in both of these treatments is slightly lower
overall than in the control, but again, substantially higher after an escrow amount of 3 than after an
escrow amount of 0. In the Escrow03 treatment, allocators choose to put 3 rather than 0 into escrow over
three–quarters of the time.
These aggregate data can be summarized as follows.11 First, the directional predictions of subgame
perfect equilibrium describe play rather well. Whenever subgame perfect equilibrium predicts a change
across or within treatments that change is seen in the data, in the direction predicted. Consistent with
Hypotheses 1 and 2, both investment and splitting are far more frequent in the Escrow036 and Forced036
treatments following an escrow amount of 6 than following any other escrow amount in any treatment.
However, subgame perfect equilibrium’s point predictions often perform poorly; for only a few treatments
and escrow amounts do we see levels of investment and splitting close to zero. (In the next section, we will
see that subgame perfect equilibrium fares better as a prediction of asymptotic behavior.)
Second, these aggregate data show evidence of crowding out. Recall that crowding out implies that
investment and splitting should be less frequent, and eﬃciency lower, when a weak mechanism is imposed
(in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments and in the Forced036 treatment following escrow of 0 or 3) than
11In Section 4.3, we use parametric statistics to examine these results further.
13when there is no mechanism at all (in the Control treatment). In fact, the overall frequency of investment
in all of the weak–mechanism cases is 0.381, the frequency of splitting is 0.360, and eﬃciency is 0.273,
all lower than their counterpart statistics in the Control treatment (0.400, 0.408, and 0.400, respectively).
This diﬀerence is fairly substantial for eﬃciency, but less so for investment and splitting.12
Third, levels of Invest and Split depend not only on how much was put into escrow, but also on what
other escrow choices were available (in contrast to the equilibrium prediction that the availability of other
options should be irrelevant). In particular, we see much more investment following a given escrow decision
when that was the largest possible escrow amount than when it was not. For an escrow amount of 3, this
is the largest possible escrow amount in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments, but a larger amount was
possible in the Escrow036 and Forced036 treatments. Indeed, the frequency of investment following an
escrow amount of 3 is 0.589 in the Escrow03 treatment and 0.593 in the Forced03 treatment but only 0.229
in the Escrow036 treatment and 0.320 in the Forced036 treatment. For an escrow amount of 0, this is
the largest possible escrow amount in the Control treatment, but a larger amount was possible in each of
the other four treatments; the subsequent frequency of investment is 0.400 in the Control treatment but
ranges only from 0.080 to 0.207 in the other treatments. This pattern also holds for allocators, though the
diﬀerences are sometimes small. Following an escrow choice of 3 and investment, allocators choose Split
only slightly more often in the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments (0.394 and 0.427, respectively) than in
the Escrow036 and Forced036 treatments (0.375 and 0.355). After an escrow choice of 0 and investment,
allocators choose Split more frequently in the Control treatment (0.408) than in any of the other treatments
(ranging from 0 to 0.333), though the sample sizes concerned are sometimes small.
Fourth, behavior is largely unaﬀected by whether escrow decisions are voluntary or forced. There are
essentially no apparent qualitative diﬀerences in investment, splitting, or eﬃciency between the Escrow03
and Forced03 data, nor between the Escrow036 and Forced036 data, either overall or when broken down
by escrow amount. While consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium, this result stands in contrast to
other experimental studies which show that behavior can be sensitive to such a manipulation.13
4.2 Round–by–round behavior
Figure 3 shows the round–by–round relative frequencies of Invest and Split for the Control, Escrow03, and
Escrow036 treatments. Note that these frequencies are not broken down by escrow amount. (As mentioned
earlier, sample sizes are small for escrow choices less than the maximum possible choice.) Consider ﬁrst the
initial ﬁve rounds, during which there is no escrow. Qualitative dynamics in these rounds are similar in all
three treatments (and as we will see shortly, for the other two treatments as well). The frequency of Invest
starts between about two–thirds and three–quarters, but by the ﬁfth round has declined by half or more in
12One could argue that “weak mechanism” should also include those plays in the Escrow036 treatment in which the allocator
chose to put 0 or 3 into escrow. Using this deﬁnition changes the weak–mechanism levels of investment, splitting, and eﬃciency
only slightly—0.367, 0.360, and 0.264 respectively—so that again, eﬃciency is substantially less than in the Control treatment,
while the diﬀerence is small for investment and splitting.
13Such sensitivity is most common when the situation is one where nonpecuniary aspects of outcomes are important, as in
the trust game. For example, see Cox and Deck’s (2002) results for allocators in the trust game, or Blount’s (1995) results for
the ultimatum game.
14each of the three treatments. The frequency of Split starts at about one–half and drops reasonably steadily
over these ﬁve rounds to below 20% in each treatment (and, indeed, zero in the Control treatment). Since
Invest is a monetary best response for the investor only if the probability of Split is at least one–half, it
appears that on average, investors are reacting rationally to their experiences of the behavior of allocators.
Figure 3: Round–by–round unconditional relative frequencies of Invest and Split
(Control and voluntary–escrow treatments)
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In all treatments, the levels of investment and splitting increase sharply from Round 5 to Round 6, the
ﬁrst round of the second part of the session. In the Escrow036 treatment, the equilibrium predictions for
both investment frequency and splitting frequency go from zero in Round 5 to one in Round 6, so it is not
surprising to see an increase there. In the other two treatments, the equilibrium predictions are unchanged
from Round 5 to Round 6, so it is less clear what causes these increases. In the Control treatment, there
is no change in the rules of the game from Round 5 to Round 6, so it is likely that the change in levels
of investment and splitting is due to a “restart eﬀect”—a change in behavior caused purely by referring
to Round 6 as the ﬁrst round of the second part of the session instead of one more round in the ﬁrst part
(see, for example, Andreoni (1988), Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003), Camerer and Fehr (2003), and
Croson, Fatas, and Neugebauer (2005)). The cause of the changes in investment and splitting levels in the
Escrow03 treatment may be a restart eﬀect, or may have occurred because subjects initially perceived that
some relevant aspect of the strategic environment has changed.
Dynamics in investor behavior over the last 10 rounds of the Control and Escrow03 treatments are
broadly similar. Investment frequencies start out relatively high—above 60% in both treatments—but
decline over time, though always remaining above zero (the equilibrium prediction). Allocator behavior
diﬀers somewhat in these two treatments; in the Control treatment, the frequency of Split varies between
20% and 60% but shows no time trend, while splitting in the Escrow03 treatment falls from about 50% to
zero.
We next look at the round–by–round relative frequencies of Invest and Split in the two forced–escrow
15treatments. Since the theoretical predictions for these treatments depend on which escrow amount is
imposed on allocators, and because there are large numbers of occurrences of each escrow amount (though
sample sizes are sometimes small for allocatorsin cases where investment is infrequent), we disaggregate the
data for Rounds 6–15 of these treatments according to the escrow amount. This is done for the Forced03
treatment in Figure 4 and for the Forced036 treatment in Figure 5.
Figure 4: Round–by–round relative frequencies of Invest and Split—Forced03 treatment
(conditional on escrow amount)
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Behavior in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of the forced–escrow treatments is qualitatively similar to that in the
other treatments. In both treatments, the frequency of Invest begins above 80% and the frequency of Split
begins between 40% and 60%; both trend downward over the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds, though there is an upward
bump in Round 5 of the Forced036 treatment. In Round 6, behavior in the Forced03 treatment shows a
restart eﬀect, particularly for investment (where even after a 0 escrow amount, investment is more likely
than in Round 5), though one is not apparent in the Forced036 treatment. When an escrow amount of 6 is
imposed in the Forced036 treatment, Invest is chosen 100% of the time, and Split nearly 100% of the time,
in all rounds. For the other escrow amounts in both treatments, investment tends to decline over time,
though there is a good deal of noise in these time series. There is even more noise in the allocator data in
these two treatments, due to small sample sizes in some cases, though when a time trend is apparent, it is
a downward one (that is, a decline over time in the frequency of Split).
Figure 6 shows the round–by–round eﬃciencies for each of the four treatments. As before, these
are broken down by escrow amount for the forced–escrow treatments, but not for the voluntary–escrow
treatments. There is little diﬀerence across treatments in eﬃciency for the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds (when there is
no escrow in any treatment); in each treatment, eﬃciency falls sharply over these rounds. Over Rounds
6–15, we see a divergence across treatments, as we did for the frequencies of Invest and Split. Eﬃciency
in the Forced036 treatment after an escrow amount of 6 is close to one in all rounds, while eﬃciency in
the Escrow036 treatment gradually rises as investors become more likely to choose Invest and allocators
16Figure 5: Round–by–round relative frequencies of Invest and Split—Forced036 treatment
(conditional on escrow amount)
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Figure 6: Round–by–round eﬃciencies

































































































17more likely to choose Split. In the remaining treatments, and in the Forced036 treatment when an escrow
amount of 0 or 3 is imposed, there is a downward trend to eﬃciency, as investment, splitting, or both
decrease over time.
4.3 Parametric statistics
In this section, we report the results and implications of several probit regressions. This gives us the
opportunity not only to assess the signiﬁcance of the suggestive results seen in the previous sections,
but also to increase the power of our hypothesis tests by using the entire data set rather than limiting
ourselves to data from individual treatments. Our ﬁrst regression model speciﬁcation (which we call Model
speciﬁcation I1) looks at investors’ behavior, so our dependent variable is an indicator variable for Invest
(1 if the investor chooses Invest, 0 otherwise). In order to capture the time dependence seen in Figures
3–5, we include right–hand–side variables for the round number and its square; to control for any restart
eﬀects between rounds 5 and 6, we also include an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 when
the round number is 6 or higher. To examine the eﬀects of our voluntary– and forced–escrow treatments,
as well as the actual escrow amounts, our main explanatory variables are indicators for the Escrow03,
Escrow036, Forced03, and Forced036 game (so that the baseline is the Control treatment) and for escrow
amounts of 3 and 6 (so that the baseline is an escrow amount of 0).14 Finally, we include twelve additional
explanatory variables, formed by taking the products of our four treatment indicators and two escrow–
amount indicators with the round number and the square of the round number, in order to pick up any
time variation in the eﬀects of these variables.
Our second regression model speciﬁcation (S1) looks at allocators’ behavior conditional on investment,
so our dependent variable is an indicator variable for Split. We use the same set of explanatory variables
as in the investors’ regression, but we restrict our data to the subset that follows an Invest choice by the
investor.
Our third and fourth regression model speciﬁcations (I2 and S2) are similar to the ﬁrst and second, but
add four additionalsets of variables designed to capture the interactionbetween the non–Controltreatments
and an escrow amount of 3 (so that we can assess our “crowding out” and “signaling” hypotheses). The
ﬁrst set consists of the product of our Escrow03 and “escrow amount of 3” indicator variables, the product
of this variable and the round number, and the product of this variable and the square of the round
number. The other three sets are similar, but use the Forced03, Escrow036, and Forced036 indicator
variables (respectively) instead of Escrow03. To avoid perfect collinearity, we remove the “escrow amount
of 3” indicator variable and its product with the round number and its square for these models. All four of
our regressions were performed using Stata (version 8), and incorporate individual–subject random eﬀects.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 4 and continued in Table 5. These tables show the
coeﬃcient and standard error for each variable in each of our regressions. Also shown, at the bottom of each
column in Table 5, is the absolute value of the log–likelihoodfor that regression. Before using the regression
14Recall that in Rounds 1–5 of all sessions, there is no escrow. In order for our Escrow03, Escrow036, Forced03, and Forced036
variables to actually pick up the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in rules, these refer to the games rather than the treatments. For
example, our Escrow03 variable was actually the product of indicator variables for the Escrow03 treatment and for a round
number greater than 5.
18Table 4: Coeﬃcients from probit regressions with random eﬀects (standard errors in parentheses)
Model speciﬁcation I1 S1 I2 S2
Dependent variable Invest Split (given Invest) Invest Split (given Invest)
(N = 2160) (N = 1095) (N = 2160) (N = 1095)
constant 1.503∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.195) (0.160) (0.196)
round number −0.543∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.083) (0.055) (0.084)
round2 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
round ≥ 61 .324∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.343) (0.217) (0.344)
Escrow03 –1.070 –3.137 –0.653 –7.489
(1.895) (4.822) (3.104) (—)
Escrow03*round 0.209 0.366 –0.062 –0.135
(0.394) (1.089) (0.668) (0.428)
Escrow03*round2 –0.017 –0.017 0.001 0.015
(0.019) (0.058) (0.033) (—)
Escrow036 –0.165 3.271 0.381 5.588
(3.136) (5.642) (12.873) (8.545)
Escrow036*round –0.312 –0.731 –0.134 –1.041
(0.668) (1.253) (3.474) (2.031)
Escrow036*round2 0.013 0.029 –0.016 0.038
(0.033) (0.066) (0.230) (0.113)
Forced03 −2.729∗ –5.223 –2.401 –8.570
(1.647) (4.458) (1.997) (5.842)
Forced03*round 0.460 0.871 0.416 1.561
(0.339) (1.009) (0.413) (1.295)
Forced03*round2 –0.024 –0.040 –0.022 –0.073
(0.017) (0.054) (0.020) (0.069)
Forced036 –1.659 –2.526 –1.884 2.494
(2.054) (4.927) (2.664) (8.366)
Forced036*round –0.0005 0.340 0.175 –0.643
(0.421) (1.106) (0.562) (1.971)
Forced036*round2 0.002 –0.017 –0.010 0.028
(0.020) (0.059) (0.028) (0.110)
3 escrow amount –0.784 1.878 — —
(1.747) (4.553)
(3 escrow)*round 0.391 –0.033 — —
(0.363) (1.033)
(3 escrow)*round2 –0.016 –0.004 — —
(0.018) (0.055)
6 escrow amount 0.357 4.492 0.172 1.560
(3.533) (5.747) (12.905) (8.900)
(6 escrow)*round 0.678 –0.214 0.425 0.295
(0.741) (1.254) (3.482) (2.069)
(6 escrow)*round2 –0.025 0.012 0.007 –0.008
(0.036) (0.065) (0.230) (0.114)
* (**,***): Coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
19Table 5: Probit regression coeﬃcients, continued
Model speciﬁcation I1 S1 I2 S2
Escrow03*(3 escrow amount) — — 0.286 6.568∗∗∗
(3.506) (2.030)
Escrow03*(3 escrow amount)*round — — 0.444 0.410
(0.739) (—)
Escrow03*(3 escrow amount)*round2 — — –0.026 –0.033
(0.036) (0.022)
Escrow036*(3 escrow amount) — — –4.304 2.437
(13.508) (13.110)
Escrow036*(3 escrow amount)*round — — 0.750 –0.761
(3.576) (2.947)
Escrow036*(3 escrow amount)*round2 — — –0.008 0.056
(0.234) (0.160)
Forced03*(3 escrow amount) — — –1.508 5.993
(2.646) (6.291)
Forced03*(3 escrow amount)*round — — 0.495 –0.871
(0.541) (1.383)
Forced03*(3 escrow amount)*round2 — — –0.020 0.036
(0.026) (0.073)
Forced036*(3 escrow amount) — — –1.019 –7.416
(3.514) (9.296)
Forced036*(3 escrow amount)*round — — 0.218 1.877
(0.723) (2.150)
Forced036*(3 escrow amount)*round2 — — –0.003 –0.095
(0.035) (0.118)
–ln(L) 1037.102 496.900 1028.366 491.963
* (**,***): Coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
results to revisit our hypotheses from Section 2.2, we brieﬂy note some of the other results. First of all,
neither pair of regression models nests or is nested by the other pair, so we cannot use straightforward
likelihood–ratio tests to compare them. However, we can use the similar “minimal prior information”
posterior–odds criterion developed by Klein and Brown (1984). Given two models, Model A and Model
B, the likelihood that Model A is the correct model—conditional on one or the other being the correct
model—is given by
[N−(ka−kb)/2][(Maximized Likelihood under Model A)/(Maximized Likelihood under Model B)],
where N is the sample size and ka and kb are the number of free parameters in Model A and Model B,
respectively. (Like a standard likelihood–ratio test, this measure rewards goodness–of–ﬁt but punishes free
parameters.) According to this criterion, for investors, Model Speciﬁcation I1 is over 100 billion times as
likely to be correct as Model Speciﬁcation I2, while for allocators, Model Speciﬁcation S1 is over 70 billion
times more likely than Model Speciﬁcation S2. As a result, we will generally conﬁne our discussion of
results to the ﬁrst two columns (unless, of course, we need to utilize the extra variables used in the other
columns).15
15We also note here that comparison of the two pairs of columns of coeﬃcients shows that the results are reasonably robust
to the speciﬁcation we use, so using the I2 and S2 model speciﬁcations instead would not change our results much.
20For both investors and allocators, we ﬁnd evidence of the usual restart eﬀect: the coeﬃcient of the
“round ≥ 6” indicator variable is positive and signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd evidence that behavior is time–
dependent: for both player types, the coeﬃcients for the round number and its square are signiﬁcant,
with the former negative and the latter positive, as well as being jointly signiﬁcant (χ2 = 126.70, d.f. =2 ,
p<0.001 for investors, χ2 =2 7 .23, d.f. =2 ,p<0.001 for allocators). The magnitudes of these coeﬃcients
imply that the point estimate for the round number t that minimizes βround · t + βround
2 · t2 (and hence
the probability of Invest or Split) is roughly 26.3 for investors and 21.9 for allocators; 95% conﬁdence
intervals for these minimizers are (22.4,30.1) and (16.9,27.0) respectively. Thus, over the entire time scale
of the Control sessions (which lasted for 15 rounds), the estimated frequency of both Invest and Split are
declining in the round number. This negative slope is consistent with the standard ﬁnding for trust games
that investment and splitting decrease over time. Our ﬁnding that last–movers (allocators) do change
behavior over time is consistent with a small number of studies that have looked for such changes (see, for
example, Cooper et al. (2003) in the ultimatum game).
The probit results show diﬀerences in both Invest and Split frequencies across investment amounts
and across treatments. Consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, the variables for a 6
escrow amount (that is, the “6 escrow amount” indicator and its products with the round number and
its square) are jointly signiﬁcant for both investors and allocators (χ2 = 224.48, d.f. =2 ,p<0.001 for
investors, χ2 =7 0 .58, d.f. =2 ,p<0.001 for allocators). In contrast to the equilibrium prediction, the
variables for a 3 escrow amount are also jointly signiﬁcant for both investors and allocators (χ2 = 117.16,
d.f. =2 ,p<0.001 for investors, χ2 =1 8 .52, d.f. =2 ,p<0.001 for allocators). For investors, the four
sets of treatment variables (Escrow03, Escrow03*round, and Escrow03*round2,a n ds oo n )a r ee a c hj o i n t l y
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (ranging from χ2 =1 4 .17, d.f. =3 ,p ≈ 0.003 to χ2 =4 6 .86, d.f. =3 ,
p<0.001), but this is not always true for allocators (ranging from χ2 =3 .64, d.f. =3 ,p ≈ 0.303 to
χ2 =1 2 .10, d.f. =3 ,p ≈ 0.007). Indeed, the twelve treatment variable coeﬃcients together are jointly
signiﬁcant for both investors (χ2 =7 7 .37, d.f. = 12, p<0.001) but not for allocators (χ2 =1 6 .27,
d.f. = 12, p ≈ 0.179).
The results shown in the table are not suﬃcient to test our hypotheses, as each of our hypotheses
involves a combination of several coeﬃcients. For example, determining whether investment is higher
when the escrow amount is 6 than when it is 0 requires particular attention to three coeﬃcients: those of
“6 escrow amount”, “(6 escrow)*round”, and “(6 escrow)*round2”. In round t, the expression
β6e s c r o wa m o u n t+ β(6 escrow)*round · t + β(6 escrow)*round
2 · t2
(where βY is the coeﬃcient of the variable Y ) is the eﬀect of a 6 escrow amount, rather than a 0 escrow
amount, on the argument of the normal c.d.f. used in the probit model. This expression will have the same
sign as the marginal eﬀect of a 6 escrow amount versus a 0 escrow amount.
Figure 7 shows, for each round and for both investors and allocators, the value of the expression above
(left panel), as well as corresponding expressions for the eﬀect of a 6 escrow amount versus a 3 escrow
amount (center panel), and that of a 3 escrow amount versus a 0 escrow amount (right panel), all based
on Model Speciﬁcations I1 and S1 (that is, the coeﬃcients shown in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4). The
21ﬁgure shows not only the point estimates of these eﬀects, but also estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals.16
Figure 7: Estimated eﬀects of escrow amount on Invest/Split choice based on Table 4 results
(Circles represent point estimates; line segments represent 95% conﬁdence intervals)
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As the left and center panels of the ﬁgure show, the point estimates for the eﬀect of a 6 escrow amount
versus either a 0 or a 3 escrow amount are always positive, and furthermore, the corresponding conﬁdence
intervals are entirely above zero. This means that in all rounds, both Invest and Split are signiﬁcantly more
likely (at the 5% level) after a 6 escrow amount than after a lower one—consistent with our Hypotheses
1 and 2 (which predicted exactly this). Moreover, these eﬀects tend to grow slowly over time, peaking in
Rounds 13 and 14 in one case (6 vs. 0 escrow amount for investors) while increasing monotonically over
the length of the session in the other three cases.
The right panel shows that initially, both Invest and Split are signiﬁcantly more likely after a 3 escrow
amount than after a 0 escrow amount. For investors, this eﬀect increases slightly for investors before
peaking about halfway through the session. For allocators, the eﬀect decreases monotonically, to the point
where it is not signiﬁcant in later rounds. To the extent that this eﬀect is signiﬁcant (for either investors
or allocators), it is at odds with our Hypotheses 3 and 4, according to which frequencies of Invest and Split
should be the same following either a 3 or a 0 escrow amount.
We next move to the eﬀects of our treatments. Figure 8 shows, for each round and for both investors
and allocators, the estimated eﬀects of each of the non–Control treatments, based on Model Speciﬁcations
I1 and S1 from Table 4. The four panels show, from left to right respectively, the eﬀect of the Escrow03,
Escrow036, Forced03, and Forced036 treatments versus the Control treatment, following an escrow amount
of zero. As in Figure 7, both point estimates and estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals are shown in all panels.
In each of the four panels, for both player types, and for all rounds, the point estimate for the eﬀect of
16Note that these conﬁdence intervals tend to be wider when the relevant sample sizes are smaller: for allocators—particularly
when investment is rare—versus investors, for example, or for escrow amounts of 6 versus escrow amounts of 0 or 3. Also, we
note here that we put results for investors and allocators in the same ﬁgure for reasons of space; we are at no time statistically
testing any eﬀect on investor behavior versus the corresponding eﬀect on allocator behavior.
22Figure 8: Estimated eﬀects of treatment on Invest/Split choice based on Table 4 results
(Circles represent point estimates; line segments represent 95% conﬁdence intervals)
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the treatment is negative, consistent with crowding out. However, this eﬀect is not always signiﬁcant, as
the 95% conﬁdence interval contains zero in many cases.17 It is nearly always signiﬁcant at the 5% level
for investors (the lone exception being round 6 in the Escrow03 treatment), while it is usually insigniﬁcant
at that level for allocators, especially in later rounds.
This ﬁgure also allows us to make some pairwise comparisons between treatments. For example, we can
check our assertion in Section 4.1 that behavior seemed unaﬀected by whether escrow amounts were chosen
by allocators or imposed on them by the experimenter, by comparing the eﬀect of the Escrow03 variables
with that of the Forced03 variables, or that of the Escrow036 variables with that of the Forced036 variables.
Eyeballing the ﬁgure, we see a relatively large diﬀerence between the Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments for
allocators, and in later rounds for investors; between the Escrow036 and Forced036 treatments, we see only
small diﬀerences for both investors and allocators. In fact, the eﬀect of the Escrow03 treatment versus the
Forced03 treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level for investors in Rounds 13 and 14, and
for allocators in Rounds 10–12, while the eﬀect of the Escrow036 treatment versus the Forced036 treatment
is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level for either investors or allocators. However, we note
the wide conﬁdence intervals in the ﬁgure, especially in later rounds, so we stop short of claiming that
changing between voluntary and forced escrow has no eﬀect. Rather, we just remark that we fail to ﬁnd
systematic, signiﬁcant diﬀerences between voluntary– and forced–escrow treatments.
Continuing with the discussion of crowding out, we note that the diﬀerences between Control and non–
Control treatments implied by Figure 8, while suggestive, only give partial evidence in favor of crowding
out, as the comparisons shown there assume implicitly that only zero escrow amounts are chosen in the
non–Control treatments, when in fact an escrow amount of 3 is also possible and results in the same
equilibrium prediction. Crowding out, as stated in our hypotheses, requires that frequencies of Invest and
Split should be lower in the Control treatment not only following an escrow amount of 0, but overall:
17Since crowding out makes a directional prediction, we use one–tailed rejection regions here. Therefore, if the 95% conﬁdence
interval does not contain zero, the corresponding eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 2.5% level.
23including 3 escrow amounts also. Figure 9 reports exactly this overall eﬀect on frequencies of Invest and
Split, combining the eﬀect of the treatment, the joint eﬀect of the treatment and a 3 escrow amount, and
the observed frequency of 3 escrow amounts in that treatment—conditional on an escrow amount of either
0 or 3. For example, the eﬀect on the argument of the normal c.d.f. of a 3 escrow amount in the Escrow03
treatment versus a 0 escrow amount in the Control treatment is
βEscrow03 + βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount) +











so that the overall eﬀect of the Escrow03 treatment versus the Control treatment is
βEscrow03 + p(3|Escrow03)βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount)
+











where p(3|Escrow03) is the observed frequency of 3 escrow amounts in the Escrow03 treatment. (Since
escrow amounts of 6 were not possible in this treatment, the conditional frequency of a 3 escrow amount
given either a 0 or 3 amount is the same as the unconditional frequency of a 3 amount.) Note that all
estimated coeﬃcients for this ﬁgure come from Model Speciﬁcations I2 and S2 rather than I1 and S1.
Figure 9: Estimated overall eﬀects of treatmenton Invest/Split choice based on Table 4 results and observed
escrow frequencies (Circles represent point estimates; line segments represent 95% conﬁdence intervals)
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*: Segment continues downward to –12.88.
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This ﬁgure casts some doubt on our crowding–out hypotheses. While the overall eﬀects of the four non–
Control treatments are often (though far from always) negative, these eﬀects are typically not signiﬁcant.
The overall eﬀect of either the Escrow03 or the Forced03 treatment on the frequency of Invest is signiﬁcantly
less than zero at the 5% level in only one case (the last round of the Escrow03 treatment), though it is
sometimes signiﬁcant and positive—the opposite of what crowding out would predict. The overall eﬀect of
either the Escrow036 or the Forced036 treatment on the frequency of Invest, on the other hand, is signiﬁcant
24and negative (as predicted) in early rounds, but becomes insigniﬁcant by the last round—though in the
case of Escrow036, the point estimate actually does continue to move away from zero in late rounds. The
overall eﬀect of any of the non–Control treatments on the frequency of Split is seldom signiﬁcant and
negative—the only exceptions being Rounds 6–9 and 14–15 of the Escrow03 treatment.
In sum, Figure 9 suggests that there is little systematic evidence of crowding out in our non–Control
treatments; that is, the earlier evidence we saw in Figures 3–6 disappears once we control for other variables.
However, the lack of signiﬁcance might in at least one case (investors in Escrow036) arise from the large
standard errors involved, partly due to the low number of observations of Invest choices following escrow
amounts of 0 and 3. (See also the left two panels of Figure 8.) As an attempt to reduce these standard
errors, we pool voluntary– and forced–escrow treatments with identical escrow amounts: we combine the
Escrow03 and Forced03 treatments to form the “Pooled03” treatment, and we combine the Escrow036 and
Forced036 treatments to form the “Pooled036” treatment. Figure 10 re–creates the results of Figures 8 and
9 using these pooled treatments. As the discussion surrounding Figure 8 indicated, it is not completely
Figure 10: Estimated treatment eﬀects on Invest/Split choice based on Table 4 results and observed
escrow choices (Circles represent point estimates; line segments represent 95% conﬁdence intervals)
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clear that this pooling is appropriate, as there were some diﬀerences in behavior between corresponding
voluntary– and forced–escrow treatments, so these results should be viewed with some caution. In any
event, they are broadly similar to the results of Figures 8 and 9. If only 0 escrow amounts are considered
(left and left–center panels), Invest choices are signiﬁcantly less likely in the non–Control treatments in all
rounds, while there is little eﬀect on Split choices except in early rounds of the “Pooled03” treatment. If
we consider overall eﬀects (right–center and right panels), we ﬁnd almost no signiﬁcant eﬀects for either
player type in the “Pooled03” treatment or for allocators in the “Pooled036” treatment, and while there is
a negative eﬀect for investors in the “Pooled036” treatment, the eﬀect decreases over time and eventually
becomes insigniﬁcant.
Havingfound support for our subgame–perfect–equilibrium hypotheses, but very littlefor our crowding–
out hypotheses, we now turn to our signaling hypotheses. Figure 11 shows some aspects of the interaction
25between the eﬀect of the Escrow03 treatment and that of the 3 escrow amount. Recall that our signaling
hypotheses involve two diﬀerent types of conditional frequency: an escrow amount of 3 (versus 0) con-
ditional on the treatment being Escrow03, and the treatment being Escrow03 (versus each of the other
three non–Control treatments) conditional on the escrow amount being 3. Using the variables from Model
Speciﬁcations I2 and S2 in Table 4, the eﬀect of an escrow amount of 3 rather than 0, conditional on the
treatment being Escrow03, is
βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount) + βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount)*round · t + βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount)*round
2 · t2.
The eﬀect of the Escrow03 treatment versus the Escrow036 treatment, conditional on the escrow amount
being 3, is

βEscrow03 + βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount) +[ βEscrow03*round + βEscrow03*(3 escrow amount)*round]t
+[βEscrow03*round





βEscrow036 + βEscrow036*(3 escrow amount) +[ βEscrow036*round + βEscrow036*(3 escrow amount)*round]t
+[βEscrow036*round




the expressions for the eﬀect of the Escrow03 treatment versus the Forced03 or Forced036 treatment is
similar. Estimated values of these four expressions, along with estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals are
s h o w ni nF i g u r e1 1 .
Figure 11: Estimates of interactions between treatments and 3 escrow amount on Invest/Split choice based
on Table 4 results (Circles represent point estimates; line segments represent 95% conﬁdence intervals)
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The panels tell somewhat similar stories. The left panel shows that the eﬀect of a 3 escrow amount on
both investors and allocators, conditional on the Escrow03 treatment, is initially signiﬁcant and positive
(they are more likely to choose Invest or Split after a 3 escrow amount in this treatment than after a 0
escrow amount).18 For allocators, the eﬀect decreases monotonically over time so that it is statistically
18Again, since our hypothesis is directional, we use a one–tailed rejection region.
26indistinguishable from zero by the 10th round. For investors, there is initially a slight increase, but
eventually it also decreases, and is statistically insigniﬁcant by the last round. The remaining panels
show that the eﬀect on allocators of the Escrow03 treatment (versus the other non–Control treatments)
conditional on a 3 escrow amount is never signiﬁcantly positive (though it is signiﬁcantly negative for
Rounds 9–12 in the right–center panel). For investors, this eﬀect starts out signiﬁcant and positive in each
of the three panels, but as it does in the left panel, decreases until eventually becoming insigniﬁcant. Thus,
according to either panel in this ﬁgure, the evidence for signaling by allocators is at best ambivalent, while
the evidence is reasonably strong that investors initially interpret certain allocator choices as signals, but
that this belief dies out over time.
5 Conclusions
There is a growing literature studying mechanisms designed to induce cooperative behavior—and hence
raise eﬃciency—in situations where rational, self–interested behavior is predicted to lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes. The trust game is a simple example of such a situation: the moral–hazard problem for allocators
leads investors (in theory) to avoid investment, even though investment always leads to gains. We look at
an escrow mechanism for this game that is predicted, in some cases, to lead to increased eﬃciency. Under
this mechanism, the allocator puts an amount of money into an account, to be forfeited if he succumbs
to the moral–hazard problem. Our experiment has ﬁve treatments, corresponding to ﬁve versions of this
escrow mechanism. Our Control treatment uses only the basic trust game, with no positive escrow amount
possible. In our two voluntary–escrow games, the allocator is able to choose a positive escrow amount, if he
wishes, but these two games diﬀer in which amounts are allowed. In our Escrow03 game, only low amounts
(too low to lead to cooperation in any subgame perfect equilibrium) are possible, while in the Escrow036
game, one of the possible choices is high enough for equilibrium cooperation. Our remaining two games,
Forced03 and Forced036, correspond to the two voluntary–escrow games, but in these, the escrow amount
is exogenously imposed on the allocator, rather than chosen by him.
In our experiment, we address three sources of hypotheses. First, we consider subgame perfect equilib-
rium, which predicts that the players will behave cooperatively (the investor will invest and the allocator
will split the proceeds) if and only if the amount put into escrow is suﬃciently large. According to the
subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, our mechanism may lead to increased cooperation and eﬃciency,
but at worst will have no eﬀect. Second, we consider “crowding out”, a behavioral theory according to
which externally–imposed mechanisms reduce or eliminate individuals’ intrinsic tendencies to be coopera-
tive. According to crowding out, our mechanism could actually reduce cooperative behavior and eﬃciency
if the escrow amounts allowed are too small. Finally, we consider “signaling”, a behavioral theory ac-
cording to which allocators use a choice of the escrow amount to signal their intention to cooperate, so
that investors, understanding this, cooperate as well—even in the Escrow03 game, where this maximum
escrow amount is not high enough to make cooperation payoﬀ–maximizing for the allocator (and thus the
investor). According to signaling, our mechanism may not increase cooperation and eﬃciency overall, but
would result in a dependence of cooperation (and eﬃciency) on the escrow amount when this amount is
chosen voluntarily, but not when it is imposed.
27We ﬁnd three main sets of results. First, when the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts diﬀerences
across treatments, subject behavior is consistent with these predictions. We do indeed ﬁnd more investment
by investors and more returns by allocators when the high amount is put into escrow than following other
escrow amounts. However, subgame perfect equilibriumperforms poorly in other ways; for example, there is
also more investment and splitting following the low escrow amount than the zero escrow amount (subgame
perfect equilibrium predicts no diﬀerence).
The other theories we considered perform less well. We tested a “crowding out” hypothesis that
predicts that investment and splitting should be more likely in the Control treatment—the only one with
no externally–imposed mechanism in place—than in any of the others. We found only very weak evidence
in favor of crowding out: in some of our games, it didn’t seem to occur at all, and in others, behavior was
initially consistent with crowding out, but the eﬀect died out quickly. If we restrict ourselves to looking
only at behavior following a zero escrow amount (thus using a weaker deﬁnition of crowding out that
the one usually used), we did ﬁnd somewhat lower levels of investment and splitting in the non–Control
treatments than in the Control treatment. However, the increases in investment and splitting following
the low escrow amount (compared to the zero escrow amount) roughly cancel this out, making the overall
eﬀect negligible (and insigniﬁcant) in almost all rounds.
We also tested a “signaling” hypothesis that assumes that choosing a low positive escrow amount can
be construed as a signal that the allocator intends to split. If this were true, then given a low positive
escrow amount, investment and splitting would be more likely if that was the largest amount possible—and
chosen voluntarily—than when either of these were not true. While the low positive amount was chosen
frequently (more than three–quarters of the time) in the Escrow03 treatment, there is little evidence that
this was actually a signal of cooperation by allocators, as we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more splitting here
than in the other cases. We did ﬁnd, however, that investors initially seem to interpret a low positive
escrow amount as a signal of intention to split, but over time and with evidence to the contrary, they learn
to ignore such “signals”.
Our results lead us to several conclusions. First, as the above makes clear, standard game theory is
quite useful for describing behavior in our experiment. Not only does play by both investors and allocators
move in the direction of the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction—so that it is a good prediction of
asymptotic behavior—but subgame perfect equilibrium also fares well as a point prediction by the ﬁnal
round of each treatment. We cannot completely ignore the possibility of non–equilibrium phenomena, as
we did ﬁnd at least some evidence of both crowding out and signaling, as well as the perception of signaling
by others. However, these phenomena are by and large transitory; all three disappear relatively quickly.
We next make a note regarding our use of sequential–move games rather than simultaneous–move
games. In simultaneous–move games, all players make decisions under strategic uncertainty, so it can be
diﬃcult to disentangle players’ preferences from their beliefs about other players’ behavior, based on the
actions they choose. In particular, when changes in behavior over time are observed, it is often unclear
whether players are adapting to their opponents’ play or evolving their own preferences. In sequential–
move games, on the other hand, the player moving last (the allocator, in our games) faces no strategic
uncertainty. Thus, any decision observed should be the result of only preferences, and if these decisions
change over time, this should be due to changing preferences. When (as in the current paper) we do
28not ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes over time in allocators’ decisions, we can infer that changes in behavior over
time by other subjects (such as investors in this experiment) or in subjects in similar experiments by
other researchers (such as Bracht, Figui` eres, and Ratto (2004)) are due to learning rather than changing
preferences.
Finally, we wish to encourage more work on mechanisms for increasing eﬃciency. Our results suggest
that these mechanisms will work only to the extent that they provide unambiguous monetary incentives for
cooperative behavior. An implication of this is that two mechanisms that look roughly similar may have
vastly diﬀerent eﬀects, based on the predictions made by standard game theory. A mechanism that “gets
the incentives right” could lead to high levels of cooperation and eﬃciency—even in an environment, such as
ours, where individuals have previously played a game that typically leads to betrayal and frustration. On
the other hand, a mechanism that gets the incentives wrong could lead to levels of cooperation and eﬃciency
no better than, and possibly even worse than, when there is no mechanism at all. We acknowledge the
possibility that there exist other mechanisms that do lead to increased cooperation and eﬃciency beyond
what is theoretically predicted, but further research is necessary to determine whether this is true, and if
so, what form they take.19
19As a next step, Bracht and Feltovich (in preparation) examine costless and costly signaling mechanisms and their eﬀect
on investment and splitting in the trust game.
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